Publications

The delegation of governance tasks to third parties is generally assumed to help governments to avoid blame once policies become contested. International organizations, including the European Union (EU), are considered particularly opportune in this regard. The literature lacks assessments of the blame avoidance effects of delegation, let alone of the effects of different delegation designs. To address this gap in the literature, we study public blame attributions in the media coverage of two contested EU policies during the financial as well as the migration crisis. more

This chapter develops a theory of wedge issue politics in modern democracies. It argues that wedge issues are associated with a politics of intransigence which differs from the politics of concessions that typically comes with non-wedge issues. This theory explains why Prime Minister Theresa May opted for a divisive approach to secure ratification of her Brexit agreement in the House of Commons. more

The politicisation of the EU renders blame avoidance for unpopular EU policies an essential task for governments. this article looks at one particular blame avoidance strategy, which governments have at their disposal in the eU policy process: the threat of non-compliance. in order to gauge its effectiveness, two competing arguments are presented. more

How do international organizations (IOs) react to the blame of their member states? Research often depicts IOs as good scapegoats for their member states’ blame shifting when their policies fail because they do not have the need, ability or willingness to defend themselves. We argue, however, that IO representatives try to avoid blame for failed policies in public. IOs are thus not passive blame takers, but active blame avoiders. more

This paper develops a theory of wedge issue politics in modern democracies. It argues that wedge issues are associated with a politics of intransigence which differs from the politics of concessions that typically comes with non-wedge issues. This theory explains why Prime Minister Theresa May opted for a divisive approach to secure ratification of her Brexit agreement in the House of Commons. more

Blame games between governing and opposition parties are a characteristic feature of domestic politics. In the European Union (EU), policymaking authority is increasingly shared among multiple actors across different levels of governance. How does EU integration affect the dynamics of domestic blame games? more

Who blames whom in multi-level blame games? Existing research focuses either on policy-makers’ preferences or their opportunities offered by the institutional structures in which policy-makers operate. As these two strands of literature barely refer to each other, in this paper we develop an integrated theoretical model of blame-shifting in multi-level governance systems and assess it empirically. more

Who is held publicly responsible for mistakes in EU policies? We argue that in complex policy-making systems responsibility tends to be attributed to implementing actors. more

Who is held publicly responsible for the policies of international institutions? Are member states or supranational bodies held responsible or are public responsibility attributions (PRA) untargeted? We argue that in complex policy‐making systems responsibility tends to be attributed to implementing actors. When, however, a policy does not require active implementation, we expect responsibility attributions to be untargeted. more